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No justice no peace

was once a troubled country with a historical mining of massacres and political abuses, which ushered in the bipolar confrontation embodied in military and paramilitary guerrillas, with their guns and chainsaws paid to dead mass graves and cemeteries.

After more than 5 decades of violence, that country (which we will call Colombia) signed a law that sheltered under the principle of opportunity for some side of the armed conflict, providing criminal indulgences to its members, provided that they reveal the truth about the crimes they had perpetrated.

Colombia passed a law (call for Justice and Peace) is not only hoping to re-enter civilian life more than 30 000 combatants, but also to provide full reparation to victims the conflict, which for decades sought the truth about their deaths and the recovery of the territories that violence had taken.

However, five years after entry into force of Justice and Peace, the hopes in the process became diluted to the incontrovertible results of their failure. The country was, then, how recidivism and corruption gave severe blows to the law, but mostly saw the judicial ineffectiveness buried the hopes of redress and justice for thousands of victims.

emerging in a fable you can count the transitional justice process undertaken by Colombia in the midst of the government of Alvaro Uribe, who sought to portray itself as the hero of peace, under the banner of a law today show the consequences of a rocky road traveled barefoot.

4,511 authors from 52 thousand crimes, and only 3 convictions is the result which gives us a draft "national reconciliation", whose components are now called into question, as far be sentenced for their heinous crimes, the Colombian paramilitaries took the legal inefficiency to dominate at will statements and tarnished its mafia state bodies.

Desde las alcaldías de pequeños poblados, hasta el sótano de cierta casa presidencial fueron visitados por agentes de la subversión ultraderechista, mientras que el Estado declaraba de manera indirecta su incompetencia para manejar un proceso de dicha magnitud.

Sin lugar a dudas, uno de los actos que encarna a la perfección esta idea fue la extradición de los principales cabecillas de las Autodefensas, una decisión presidencial que echó por la borda las ilusiones de lograr reparación integral en Colombia, negándole a las víctimas la posibilidad de confrontar los  rostros de quienes propiciaron sus tragedias.

But more serious still were the implications of extraditing leaders like 'Don Berna' and 'HH', in the midst of a key process in Colombian history. Make them available to the United States was to recognize not only the failure of our courts, but hindered the process, creating an expansion of the truth just as it began to play members of Colombian politics.

Now, the 300 000 affected by the paramilitaries appear not only as victims of armed actors, but also the lethargy with which such bodies as the prosecutor's office have taken their responsibility to the trials.

And if it is true that truth is one of the "great achievements" made by Act 975 of 2005, so is that it is in limbo not being accompanied by statements that force the public plea for forgiveness and material compensation to victims. With this, paramilitaries statements (of which there is doubt even today) are a vague reflection of what should be a transitional justice.

As clearly explained International Center for Transitional Justice: "The legal measures, such trials are not sufficient." And in a country where even this minimal condition is met, it is unthinkable to dream with the right mix of material and moral relief as possible to grant forgiveness to those who have lost so much with the conflict.

Justice and look like a pretty word mentioned, redundant if you will. But that is what has called the Colombian people before the decade of 50, when Rojas Pinilla created the 'Guerrillas of Peace', considered as the origin of paramilitaries in Colombia. Is a key element to channel conflict societies and understood Chile and South Africa.

But justice remains a distant aspiration, a false promise that repeatedly demonstrates the weakness of our state. A chimera that historically has led us down the path of arms, believing that they will meet again the balance that will lead to peace renowned.

@ rincondesantos


photo taken of www.periodismohumano.com

Realtek Gbe Fe Ethernet

euphemism Rites

two years ago, before they officiate as High Commissioner for Peace, the official Frank Pearl showed at the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana program benefits Reintegration of the Presidency of the Republic, whose aim was to make productive citizens armed and useful for Colombian society.

"Re-Pearl-has said the approach of giving financial support in exchange for a person to stop the weapon. Reintegration is more complex and is based on generating capacity in people, including family and community, so it is a long-term process and should be sustainable, ie it is based on the efforts of those demobilized and has certain limits. "

The presentation of the official was careful not to mention paramilitary, paramilitary groups or anything resembling it, because by then the Government had managed the not inconsiderable 'miracle' to reintegrate more than 30 thousand members of groups extreme right outside the law.

However, without realizing it, Frank Pearl gave the key to understanding the conflict situation facing the country today, and that surprised many, as if it were an unusual case . Uribe and the heads of local authorities who accompanied drove the paramilitary demobilization buying process of consciousness and economic privileges, to pay the rifles with which they waged war in Colombia. It was, as would the former High Commissioner for Peace, a process of reintegration.

The effort of the demobilized paramilitaries, integration with the families of the actors in the conflict and the formation process to return to the legal life were scarce items that demobilization, which only appeared when the government needed the media to boast of their supposed successes.

Recidivism was, therefore, product lack of planning and the ease with which they took a missed opportunity by both parties. And consequently, the prosecution of leaders of paramilitary gangs had multiple setbacks, exploited by those who now sow new terror in paramilitary organizations not willing to cede more land.

Like Pearl, the new Colombian officials (those who 'will change the country') are careful not to mention the word Self-Defense and they have used the euphemism useful tool both served in Colombia to mislead the unwary and Incidentally, embellish reality.

Under the name of criminal gangs, was named the alleged "new phenomenon of domestic violence." And with each passing day, the title was reduced to an expression quite sound but little explained: BACRIM. The Colombian media, little given to reflection and very similar to a mirror of the ruling party, tirelessly repeating the acronym own mouth or officials, without going into detailed analysis to delve into the famous abbreviation.

However, it seems that behind de la palabra Bacrim hay una marcada intención que sobrepasa la ingenuidad de los medios: rendirle pleitesía al pasado Gobierno, ocultando con unas cuantas sílabas las consecuencias de la condescendencia con que Uribe trató el paramilitarismo en Colombia.  

Los más uribistas dirán que con la salida del ex mandatario se fue la seguridad y la tranquilidad del país. Pero resulta bastante cuestionable que en tan poco tiempo ‘reviva’ la criminalidad, así como es de dudosa procedencia la tesis de que las Bandas Crminales (o Bacrim, para seguir el protocolo) están desmoronando la defensa del país.  

Most media now seem to have communed with this approach. But let me skeptical, saying that poor should be built democratic security for 8 years, if only 6 months of "isolated criminal gangs" are able to shake it.


@ rincondesantos